Topic
All articles on SCADA.
Cybersecurity
There is no single best OT cybersecurity platform — there is the right one for your ICS network, your protocols, and your maturity level. Concrete criteria for choosing without being guided by marketing.
Cybersecurity
Admin/admin, 1234, the vendor's factory credentials: how many OT installations still have access protected by default passwords? More than you would expect. How it happens, how attackers find it, and how to fix it without stopping production.
Cybersecurity
The industrial DMZ is the architectural layer that separates IT and OT and manages data flows between the two worlds. Designing it well is the difference between a secure connection and a direct path to the heart of the production network.
Cybersecurity
The pivot from IT into the OT network is the critical phase of nearly every documented industrial attack. Understanding the techniques used to cross this boundary is the first step to detecting it early.
Cybersecurity
MITRE ATT&CK for ICS is not a document to skim once and file away. Turning its techniques into concrete detection rules means knowing what you can really see on your network and what stays out of reach without endpoint visibility.
Cybersecurity OT
Placing an inline monitoring system between SCADA and PLC introduces latency that industrial systems cannot tolerate. The right answer is passive out-of-band monitoring, with isolation and network changes as the response tool.
Cybersecurity
In oil & gas, cybersecurity is intertwined with process safety: a cyber incident can become a physical one. Risks, safety systems and strategies for refineries, pipelines and terminals.
Cybersecurity
OPC-UA is the de facto standard for communication in modern SCADA systems, but it is often deployed with degraded security settings for legacy client compatibility. Here is what shows up in the traffic and what an attacker can exploit.
Cybersecurity
Local utilities (water operators, power distributors, waste treatment plants) are NIS2-regulated entities with security resources close to zero. SCADA systems 15 to 20 years old connected to the internet, run by a single technician: how to set up OT security from this starting point.
Cybersecurity
PLCs with 2008 firmware, HMIs running embedded Windows XP, systems that cannot be touched by contract: the reality of Italian plants. How to manage risk when patching is not an option.
Cybersecurity
OT network topology often lives only in a technician's head, or in a 2014 diagram that was never updated. Rebuilding it from scratch with passive traffic monitoring: why it is necessary and how it is done in practice.
Cybersecurity
Industrial process historians collect data from PLCs and expose it to business systems. This makes them a natural bridge between IT and OT, and a prime vector for lateral movement.
Cybersecurity
Passive OT traffic monitoring depends on where and how traffic is captured. Hardware TAPs and SPAN ports have very different characteristics in industrial environments: a wrong choice means incomplete data or operational risks.
Cybersecurity
Water and wastewater treatment plants are critical infrastructures with often obsolete OT systems and exposed remote connections. A sector that industrial cybersecurity still struggles to reach.
Cybersecurity
The blackout that brought Spain and Portugal to a standstill shows how fragile energy grids are and why visibility into OT assets is decisive.
